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Despite being next-door neighbors, sharing a common language (for the most part'), and being characterized as modern

Western democracies, the High Courts of the United States and

Canada have developed noticeably distinct lines of jurisprudence
when it comes to the infringement of fundamental rights. Scholars
have linked the divergence to numerous factors. One is the two
countries' distinct cultural histories which have led to a different
hierarchy of values.' Also noted, are the subtle differences in the
constitutional texts that the courts must interpret.3 But apart
from simply noting the difference in approach and hypothesizing
as to why it exists, scholars and law students alike seem to be in
constant debate over which model achieves the best results. There
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2011, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. in
French & Music, 2006, Florida State University. I would like to express my gratitude

to Professor Stephen Schaably, whose guidance and insight made this article possible.
1. On n'oublie pas les Qu~b~cois. ("Quebecers are not forgotten.")
2. See Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A
Comparative Analysis, 24 CARnozo L. RE~V. 1523, 1542 (2003) (noting that the U.S.
has embraced an assimilationalist ideal of the "melting pot" whereas Canada has
placed greater emphasis on diversity, symbolized as an "ethnic mosaic").
3. See Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 55 L~w &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 7 (1992) (noting, with regards to the First Amendment, that the
'the' preceding 'freedom of speech' might be argued to mean whatever 'freedom of
speech' existed at common law when the amendment was drafted).

390

390
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:3

is also little consensus as to whether the Canadian Supreme
Court is tending to become more like the United States Supreme
Court or vice versa.4
Because the constitutions of the United States and Canada
both include protections for freedom of speech 5 and freedom of
religion,' the debate over which model is superior often centers on
these two specific constitutional rights. As will be fully described
below, the U.S. Supreme Court has historically applied what is
perhaps best described as a categorical or an all-or-nothinganalysis to First Amendment infringements. The Canadian Supreme
Court, on the other hand, follows a case-by-case proportionality
test whenever any Charter right has been trenched upon by a particular law.' Rather than suggesting that one model is better
overall or arguing that one Court is beginning to follow the lead of
the other, this article suggests that there are simply certain occasions where the U.S. Supreme Court must resort to proportionality and the Canadian Supreme Court must categorize to avoid
absurd results. Continuing with the themes of free speech and
free exercise of religion, this paper suggests that there are two
realms where the High Courts must employ different standards
than those typically adhered to. For the U.S., this occurs when
dealing with hate speech regulations. For Canada, it is when the
Court must grapple with generally applicable laws that incidentally affect the freedom of religion.
Section I of this article will introduce the United States
Supreme Court's historically categorical approach with respect to
free expression and contrast it with the Canadian Supreme
Court's proportionality test. Section 11 will highlight how the U.S.
Supreme Court has employed proportionality rather than categorization in two cases dealing with laws banning hate speech and
explain why a categorical approach is not well-suited in this area.'
4. See e.g., Donald L. Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill v. Colorado and Free
Speech Balancing in the United States and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187
(2001); Matthew S. Melamed, Towards an Explicit Balancing Inquiry? R.A.V. and
Black through the Lens of Foreign Freedom of Expression Jurisprudence,59 HASTINGS
L.J. 407 (2007).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. L.; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11
(U.K.).Ithereinafter Charter] at § 2(b).

6.

U.S. CONST.

amend. L.; Charter, § 2(a).

7. Canada's equivalent to the Bill of Rights is the Canadian Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms, enacted in 1982.
8. The two cases are R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) and Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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Section III will target an older Canadian case to highlight the
early use of proportionality vis-A-vis generally applicable laws
that incidentally affect the freedom of religion? This will be contrasted, in Section IV, with the U.S. Supreme Court's use of categorization." Finally, Section V will focus on a recent decision in
which the Canadian Supreme Court seems to have adopted a categorical approach much more akin to that seen in the U.S."1 This
last section will also offer an explanation as to why proportionality
does not lend itself well to dealing with generally applicable laws
that incidentally burden religion.

I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES To FREE SPEECH
IN THE U.S. AND IN CANADA

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.""2 As Professor Donald Beschle points out, this language
suggests an absolute inability for Congress (or the states, by way
of the Fourteenth Amendment) to enact a law that in any way
restricts the freedom of speech.'" Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
notes that such a strict interpretation would disallow perjury laws
or laws that prohibit spectators' yelling out in court, making it
impossible for the judge to hear.'" But the Supreme Court has
never interpreted the First Amendment in this literal way.'" In
lieu of adhering to an absolutist view of the freedom of speech, the
Supreme Court has instead carved out certain categories of speech
that, according to the Court, simply do not enjoy First Amendment protection and may therefore be regulated.
It was the hand of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that carved
out the earliest category of speech deemed to have no First
9. The case examined will be R. v. Videoflicks, Ltd., [19861 2 S.C.R. 713 (Can.).
10. Categorization in this constitutional area will be exemplified by Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
11. The recent decision is Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, [2009]
2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.).

12.

U.S. CQNST.

amend. 1.

13. Beschle, supra note 4, at 190.
14. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTrIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.2
(3d ed. 2006).
15. The Court explicitly stated in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
570 (1976) that it has "frequently denied that First Amendment rights are
absolute. . ." See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961)
("[TIhis Court has consistently recognized ... [that the] freedom of speech is narrower
than an unlimited license to talk.").
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Amendment protection. In Schenck v. United States, Holmes
articulated his "clear and present danger" exception." In Schenk,
the Court was faced with what it classified as speech likely to
bring about an imminent and significant harm to the efforts of a
nation at war-speech that Congress had a right to limit and that
no court could rationally view as being protected by any constitutional right."8 Thus, Schenck's conviction under the Espionage Act
of 1917 for circulating a leaflet analogizing the draft to involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment was
upheld.
The clear and present danger exception addressed speech
advocating illegal acts or the overthrow of the government. The
Court then carved out an additional exception for speech so
inflammatory that it may drive an audience to take lawless action
against its speaker.
Walter Chaplinsky was distributing religious pamphlets on a
street corner when he accosted a passerby, yelling "I[y]lou. are a God
damned racketeer and a damned Fascist. .. ."19 After Chaplinsky
was convicted for violating a state law that prohibited such offensive name-calling in a public place, the Supreme Court affirmed,
explaining that "'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace," can be punished without raising any constitutional
problems. Professor Chemerinsky points out that the Court has
not overruled Chaplinsky but has never again upheld a fighting
words conviction, usually by instead finding the statute involved
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
The Court has carved out exceptions for many other categories of speech that, in its judgment, should not receive First
Amendment protection. Speech may be restricted as "obscene"
when it portrays conduct in a patently offensive manner in order
to appeal to a "prurient interest in sex.""2 Child pornography can
be prohibited even if it does not meet the test for obscenity." This
article does not attempt to cover every type of speech that may be
reg-ulated, but rather to simply illustrate the Court's ability to cat16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Konisberg, 366 U.S. 36, 52.
Id.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942) (citation omitted).
Id. at 572.

21.

CHEMERINSKY,

supra

note 14, at § 11.3.3.2.

22. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
23. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
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egorically exempt certain types of speech from First Amendment
protection, and thus, allow that speech to be restricted or entirely
proscribed.
This categorical method contrasts sharply with the proportionality test employed by the Canadian Supreme Court. As mentioned above, this divergence relates, in part, to the text of
Canada's Constitution. Unlike the seemingly absolute language of
the First Amendment, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms begins with a disclaimer stating that all the rights and freedoms contained therein may be subject to "such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society. 2 14 As Professor Beschle argues, the language
in Section 1 explicitly instructs Canadian courts to engage in a
balancing test where the government's demonstrably justifiable
interest is weighed against the particular Charter right."5 This
seems a fair reading of the Charter. But even if the constitutional
language does not expressly call for the use of balancing, the
Canadian Supreme Court has definitively interpreted Section 1 of
the Charter as requiring it. As Justice Abella has aptly stated,
"[plroportionality is, after all, what [Section] 1 is about.""
The exact form of the proportionality test was explained in
the 1986 decision of R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103(Can). There,
the Court held that in every case where Section 1 of the Charter is
relied upon to validate a legislative infringement of a fundamental
right, "courts will be required to balance the interests of society
with those of individuals and groups." The tetis carried out by
making the following determinations: (1) whether the impugned
legislation has an objective of pressing and substantial concern;
and (2) whether there is proportionality between the objective and
the means chosen to fulfill it. The second prong requires the court
to ask the following three questions: (1) Is measure is rationally
connected to the objective?; (2) Does it impair the right or freedom
in question as little as possible?; and (3) Is there is proportionality
between the effects of the measure and its objective. Regarding
this last inquiry, the Court emphasized that "[t~he more severe
the deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be [to be justified by Section 1] .1"21 Failure at any stage of
24.
25.
26.
(Can.)
27.
28.

Charter § 1.
Beschie, supra note 4, at 188.
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567,.630
(Abella, J., dissenting).
R. v. Oakes, [19861 1 S.C.R. 103, 139. (Can).
Id. at 141.
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the test will mean that the legislation in question cannot be saved
under Section 1, and accordingly will be found unconstitutional.
The Oakes proportionality test has since been applied every
time a particular law is challenged as having infringed a fundamental right. Section 2(b) of the Charter protects the freedom of
speech 9 and so an examination of how the proportionality test has
been applied to infringements of this specific right-particularly
regarding hate speech legislation-will now be addressed.
Section 319 of the Criminal Code of Canada makes it unlawful (and punishable by up to two years in prison) to make "statements, other than in private conversation, [that] willfully
promote[ I hatred against an identifiable group .... *3 Identifiable
group is defined as "any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion, or ethnic origin. "131 In 1984, a high school
teacher named Jim Keegstra was convicted under Section 319 for
teaching his social studies students that Jews were "treacherous,
subversive, sadistic, money-loving, power-hungry, and child kill32
ers . .. [who] created the Holocaust to gain sympathy.1
In analyzing the constitutional challenge to the statute, the
Canadian Supreme Court had to first decide whether Keegstra's
free speech rights had been infringed, and then, whether that
infringement could be justified by Section 1 of the Charter using
the Oakes test. The Court dealt with the former inquiry, concluding that Keegstra's teachings fell within the Charter definition of
"expression" because they conveyed a meaning and had expressive
content. This, the Court held, "primafacie falls within the scope of
the guarantee. "33 The Court also held that the clear purpose of
Section 319 was to restrict certain types of expression. As such,
the statute necessarily constituted an infringement of the freedom
of expression as guaranteed by the Charter. Having made these
initial determinations, the Court moved on to the Section 1 analysis as delineated in Oakes.
First, the Court needed to decide whether the measure had a
pressing and substantial objective. To answer this question, the
Court asked "whether the amount of hate propaganda in Canada
29. Charter, § 2(b) ("Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression. . .)
30. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319(2) (1985).
31. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 318(4) (1985).
32. R. v. Keegstra, [19901 3 S.C.R. 697, 714.
33. Id. at 729.
34. Id. at 730.

. ..

(b)
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causes sufficient harm to justify legislative intervention . . .
After reviewing various domestic congressional reports and international human rights instruments, the Court concluded that
hate propaganda was both pernicious and highly prevalent in
Canada. Accordingly, the suppression of hate speech amounted to
a pressing and substantial concern, worthy of legislative
attention.
Moving to the second stage of the Oakes test-the proportionality stage-the Court dealt with the issue of rational connection,
stating that "it would be difficult to deny that the suppression of
hate propaganda reduces the harm such expression does to individuals who belong to identifiable groups .... *3 But Keegstra had
suggested, among other things, that criminalizing hate speech
actually increases its prevalence due to heightened media attention and the potential of giving those convicted the status of martyrs .3 ' The Court acknowledged the extensive media attention
received when Section 319 was used, but concluded that "the message sent out is that hate propaganda is harmful to target group
members and threatening to a harmonious society.13 ' The Court
added: "[the criminal law is a very special form of governmental
regulation, for it seeks to express our society's collective disapprobation of certain acts and omissions." 9 The Court, therefore, found
that Section 319 was rationally connected, in both theory and
operation, to the legislative aim of suppressing hate.
The Court then moved on to the most difficult hurdle of the
Oakes test,4 0 asking whether the measure infringed as little as
possible on the freedom of expression. Keegstra argued that Section 319 was overbroad, encompassing expression that was not in
fact hate propaganda. To determine whether that was actually the
case, the Court focused on the exact terms of the provision and the
enumerated defenses that were available to those charged with
violating it. First, the Court noted that Section 319, by its own
terms, could not be used to prosecute statements made "in private
conversation." The Court explained that this exemption effectively
meant that even statements made in public places were not neces35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 745.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 768.
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 769.
Id. (citing R. v. Morgentaler, [19881 1 S.C.R. 30, 51 (Can.)).

40.

BERNARD

A NUTSHELL

W.

FUNSTON

& EUGENE

MEEHAN, CANADA'S CONSTITUTioNAL LAW IN

173 (Paperback, 3d ed. 2003).
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sarily covered . 4 ' The Court also highlighted the statutory requirement that the promotion of hatred be willful. According to the
Court, "[t]his mental element, requiring more than merely negligence or recklessness as to result, significantly restricts the reach
of the provision, and thereby reduces the scope of the targeted
expression." The Court completed a similar analysis for the statutory use of the words "promote142 and "hatred" and concluded that
the statute, by using precise and specific language, did not reach
an unnecessarily wide range of expression. Moreover, Section 319
laid out four affirmative defenses, 43 which, for the Court, meant
even greater protection for expression that would otherwise be
punishable as the willful, non-private, promotion of hatred.
Accordingly, Section 319 passed the minimal impairment prong of
the proportionality test.
In the third prong of the proportionality analysis, Canadian
courts concern themselves with the possibility that "the deleterious effects of a limit [on a fundamental right) may be too great to
permit the infringement of the right or guarantee in issue.""4 The
Keegstra Court stated that "[flew concerns can be as central to the
concept of a free and democratic society as the dissipation of
racism, and the especially strong value which Canadian society
attaches to this goal must never be forgotten in assessing the
effects of an impugned legislative measure."" As such, the Court
had "little trouble in finding that its effects, involving as they do
the restriction of expression largely removed from the heart of free
expression values, are not of such a deleterious nature as to outweigh any advantage gleaned from [Section 319.""1 Because Section 319 passed all stages of the Oakes test, the Court held the
41. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697 at 772.
42. Here, the Court compared the English verb "to promote" to the verb used in
French version of the Code: fomenter, which translates as "to stir up." The Court
determined that this was sufficiently more than simple encouragement or
advancement. Id. at 776.
43. Section 319(3) provides that "No person shall be convicted . . . (a) if he
establishes that the statements communicated were true; (b) if, in good faith, he
expressed or attempted to establish by argument an opinion on a religious subject; (c)
if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion of
which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he believed them to be
true; or (d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of removal,
matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable
group in Canada." Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 3 19(3) (1985).
44. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697 at 786.
45. Id. at 787.
46. Id.
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statute was saved under Section 1 of the Charter and was therefore constitutional.
But Jim Keegstra was not the only Canadian feeling hateful
at the time. John Taylor, a prominent neo-Nazi leader, had set up
a scheme in 1977 where callers could dial a particular number and
listen to pre-recorded anti-Semitic messages . 7 He was found liable under Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, which
forbids the use of the telephone to repeatedly communicate any
matter that is likely to expose a person to hatred or contempt on
account of enumerated grounds.4 The provision is civil; at the
time, upon finding a violation, the Human Rights Tribunal could
only impose a cease and desist order .49 This order, if not obeyed,
could be enforced in federal court through a finding of contempt of
court. The applicable punishment for contempt of court was a
$5,000 fine or a one-year term of imprisonment."0
Taylor alleged that Section 13 violated his Charter-protected
right to free expression. The Canadian Supreme Court was therefore forced to decide whether this civil provision could similarly be
justified under Section 1 of the Charter. Unlike the legislation at
issue in Keegstra, Section 13 did not provide for affirmative
defenses or require the element of intent.
Applying the rationale used in Keegstra, the Taylor Court
first found that Section 13 indeed infringed on the freedom of
expression. It further held that the pressing and substantial objective of curbing the pernicious effects of hate propaganda allowed
Parliament to place some limits on this freedom .5 1 The Court then
took up the remainder of the Oakes test.
In addressing whether there was a rational connection
between the end and means, the Court took much of its reasoning
from Keegstra. But it added that "the conciliatory nature of the
human rights procedure and the absence of criminal sanctions
47. Canada (Human Rights Comm'n) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, 903 (Can.).
48. The grounds are laid out in Section 2 of the Act and include (but are not
restricted to) race, national or ethnic origin, color, and religion. Id. at 902.
49. Section 13 has since been amended to allow the Tribunal to order
compensation to the victim up to $20,000 and penalties payable to the State up to
$10,000. Section 13 was again challenged as unconstitutional and in 2009, the
Tribunal held that the inclusion of penalties rendered the Act more penal in nature so
that it can no longer be said to minimally impair the Charter right. See Warman v.
Lemire, [20091 CHRT 26, 1 290. The Tribunal's ruling has no precedential value
however and, as of this writing, the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to revisit
or overturn its decision in Taylor, where it upheld Section 13.
50. Taylor, 3 S.C.R. 892 at 902.
51. Id. at 917-21.
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make [Section 13] especially well suited to encourage reform of the
communicator of hate propaganda." 52 Accordingly, the Court found
that Section 13 "promotes the ends sought by Parliament, and
consequently evinces a rational connection towards those ends.""3
But of course, even legislation that rationally secures a pressing
and substantial objective may "do so in a manner which limits a
Charter right or freedom more than is necessary."" The Court
then proceeded to the minimal impairment analysis.
Taylor argued that the Section 13 was overbroad because it
did not require intent to discriminate and therefore could be used
to punish speech that had only unintentional discriminatory
effects on a listener. The Court agreed that by focusing only on the
effect on the listener-and not the subjective intent of the
speaker-Section 13 placed a greater restriction upon the freedom
of expression than would otherwise be the case. But, the Court
accepted this heightened intrusion, noting that the goal of the
human rights statutes was the eradication of systemic discrimination, which was much more widespread than intentional discrimination."5 Thus, "[to import a subjective intent requirement into
human rights provisions, rather than allowing tribunals to focus
solely upon effects, 5 would run contrary to the fundamental aim
of such statutes.
Moreover, while the Court stated that it would have difficulty
defending a human rights provision that subjected a discriminator
to imprisonment despite a lack of intent, the repercussion of a Section 13 violation was limited to a cease and desist order. While it
was possible that imprisonment would follow in the event that the
initial order was not complied with, at that stage, the discriminator was intentionally disobeying an order and communicating
messages he or she knew had been found to cause the harm
52. Id. at 924. By "conciliatory," the Court means that the aim of human rights
statutes is not to bring the full force of the state against a blameworthy individual for
the purpose of imposing punishment. Rather, it allows conciliatory settlement, if
possible, gearing remedial responses more toward compensating the victim. See id. at
917.
53. Id. at 926.
54. Id.
55. Canada (Human Rights Comm'n) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, 931 (Can.).
The Court does not specifically state what the difference between "systemic" and
"intentional" discrimination is. Based on context and the eventual finding that
Section 13 was proportionate even without an intent requirement, it seems that the
Court believed the Canadian Human Rights statutes aim to combat the effects of
discrimination on Canadian society as a whole, rather than target individual
instances of discrimination or to punish those who discriminate.
56. Id.

20101

210]
CONSTITUTIONAL ANOMALIES39

399

described in Section 13. The Court was therefore satisfied that
an intent requirement was not necessary to find that Section 13
minimally impaired the Charter right. In fact, the Court concluded that requiring intent to discriminate would run contrary to
the provision's goal by focusing on punishing the speaker rather
than preventing the discriminatory effects.
Taylor's other major argument regarding minimal impairment was that by regulating telephonic communication, Section
13 suppressed expression in instances where the recipient of the
information was likely to agree with its contents. The Court conceded that in upholding Section 319 in Keegstra, it relied heavily
on the fact that private communications were not affected. But,
the Court did not accept that these particular telephone conversations were "private" in the Keegstra sense. The Court explained
that the telephone was "a medium which allows numerous organizations to present information and views to a sizable proportion of
the public .
*"58 The Court focused on the aggregate effect of
these racist phone campaigns and concluded that they were
"undeniably public, and the reasonable assumption to make is
that these campaigns can have an effect upon the public's beliefs
and attitudes." 9 The Court held that "the telephonic medium ..
is . .. particularly insidious""0 in publicly spreading messages of
intolerance and inequality. Finally, because Section 13 requires
"repeated" communications in order to be triggered, the Court
found that the statute was directed only at "larger-scale schemes
for the dissemination of hate propaganda16 1 , and thus, minimally
impaired free expression. The Court added one final paragraph
discussing the "effects" prong of the Oakes test in which it basically reiterated its previous analysis and concluded that Section
13 was constitutional.
Having seen the Canadian proportionality test in action, we
now explore two U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving the regulation of hate speech where the Court has employed Canadian-like
proportionality in lieu of its expected categorical analysis.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 933-34.
Id. at 937.
Id.
Canada (Human Rights Comm'n) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, 937 (Can.).
Id. at 939.
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U.S. SUPREME COURT'S USE OF PROPORTIONALITY
REGARDING HATE SPEECH LEGISLATION

In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,"2 the United States Supreme
Court struck down a city ordinance that criminalized placing, on
private or public property, symbols known to cause anger "on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.163 In this case,
R.A.V. and his teenage friends had assembled and burned a
wooden cross in the yard of a neighboring black family. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota had determined that the ordinance
only proscribed expression that constituted "fighting words"
within the meaning of Chaplinsky' and upheld it due to the fact
that fighting words were exempted from First Amendment Protection. The Supreme Court accepted that it was bound by the construction given to the St. Paul ordinance by the state's highest
court.6 " Because fighting words are not protected by the First
Amendment, the logical conclusion under a categorical analysis
would be that the city could regulate such unprotected speech in
any way it chose. Interestingly, however, the Supreme Court
found the ordinance unconstitutional.
The Court acknowledged that the goal of eradicating hate
speech was pressing and substantial. In fact, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, had no doubt that St. Paul's goal of ensuring
"the basic human rights of members of groups that have histori-

cally been subjected to discrimination16 6 was a compelling governmental interest that was clearly promoted by the ordinance. This
line of questioning mirrors steps one and two of the Oakes test,
where the Canadian Court asks whether the impugned legislation
has an objective of pressing and substantial concern and whether
the measure is rationally connected to that objective.
But rather than validate St. Paul's prohibition of specific
types of fighting words, Justice Scalia took issue with the ordinance's qualifier-that the offensive symbol must cause anger on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. Scalia noted that
"[dl isplays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or
severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the
62. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
63. Id. at 380 (citing St. Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
64. See supra, notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
65. R.A.V., 505 U.S at 381 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 339 (1986)).
66. R.Ay., 505 U.S. 377. at 395.
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specified disfavored topics.""7 Accordingly, "[those who wish to use
'fighting words' . . . to express hostility, for example, on the basis
of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality [I are
not covered."" For Scalia, the City of St. Paul effectively went too
far when it decided to regulate speech based on hostility or favoritism towards the underlying message: "[t~he dispositive question
in this case . . . is whether content discrimination is reasonably
necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling interests; it plainly is
not."6 " Scalia concluded that "St. Paul ha[d] sufficient means at its
disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First
Amendment to the fire."" In Canadian parlance, the city ordinance failed the minimal impairment prong of the Oakes test.
Even though the ordinance was rationally connected to a pressing
and substantial objective, the government had not chosen the
least restrictive means in pursuing that objective. As such, the St.
Paul ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional."
The Court once again strayed from its categorical roots eleven
years later when it considered the constitutionality of yet another
cross-burning statute. Virginia law made it a felony to burn a
cross with the intent to intimidate. Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority in Virginia v. Black, 2 noted that the statute "does not
run afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross burning
with intent to intimidate."" Unlike the statute at issue in RAY .,
the Virginia statute did not single out only those threats based on
the victim's race, gender, or religion, but instead prohibited cross
burning for any reason, so long as the underlying intention was
intimidation. The majority held that "[a] ban on cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate is fully consistent with our
holding in RAY . and is proscribable under the First
67. Id. at 391.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 395-96.
70. Id. at 396.
71. The departure from the standard, categorical analysis was fiercely criticized
by Justice White in his concurring opinion, arguing that the Court had effectively
created a new "underbreadth" doctrine, where the State must now regulate all
fighting words or none at all. Id. at 402 (White, J., concurring). He, along with
Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens, concurred that the conviction should be
reversed only on the basis that city ordinance was fatally overbroad. Id. at 397
(White, J., concurring).
72. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
73. Id. at 362. The Court suggests that this form of expression could be banned
under either the "true threats" exception, carved out in Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705 (1969) or the "fighting words" exception of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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Amendment. 7
But the Virginia statute went a step further. It also provided
that "[alny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of
an intent to intimidate.""5 According to the Black majority, this
rendered the statute unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor devoted
over five pages of her opinion to discussing the history of cross
burning-from its origins in 14th Century Scotland as a means of
inter-tribal communication to its adoption by the Ku Klux Klan in
the early Twentieth Century to celebrate shared ideology. The
majority therefore opined that "a burning cross is not always
intended to intimidate."" The prima facie evidence provision did
not distinguish between different types of cross burning and
allowed a jury to convict in cases "where the evidence of intent to
intimidate is relatively weak. 71 7 The Court held that this was
unacceptable. As one commentator has pointed out, the element of
intimidation is highly dependent on context, which the statute
completely ignores. "The statute conflates the meaning of cross
burning done in private with that done in public; cross burning
directed at like-minded believers with that directed at an individual who is the object of the group's scorn; cross burning done in a
location where the property owner has given permission with
cross burning done in the course of trespassing."" As a result, the
statute had the potential to infringe too greatly on protected
expression and was therefore not the least restrictive means of
achieving the state's goal of curtailing hate speech.
Why is it that the typical, all-or-nothing approach-where the
Court decides whether or not the particular type of speech being
regulated is deserving of First Amendment protection-does not
lend itself well to hate speech legislation? Unlike fighting words or
obscenity, which both the United States and Canadian Supreme
Courts have dubbed of "slight social value,"7 9 "utterly without
redeeming social importance,""0 and "largely removed from the
heart of free expression,""' hate speech is often entangled with
74. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996), declared unconstitutional by Elliot v. Corn.
593 S.E.2d 263 (Va. 2004).
76. Black, 538 U.S. at 365 (emphasis supplied).
77. Id. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring).
78. Melamed, supra note 4, at 418-419 (suggesting a specific two-pronged test the
Court should use for all future infringements of the freedom of expression (not just
hate speech regulation), based on the disguised balancing used in R.A.V. and Black).
79. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (fighting words).
80. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity).
81. R. v. Keegstra, [19901 3 S.C.R. 697 at 786 (racist speech).
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political ideology.8 2 The Court has consistently defended the premise that this genre of speech is at the pinnacle of First Amendment protection."3 According to the Court, a free marketplace of
ideas is a key protector of the republican form of government.' M A
categorical, all-or-nothing approach is inappropriate when only a
thin line separates speech of low social value with speech of the
very highest. Rather than pigeonhole hate speech into a previously created categorical exemption, the U.S. Supreme Court is
obliged to spend a bit more time weighing competing factors-as
exemplified by Justice O'Connor's lengthy discussion of the historical, non-threatening roots of cross burning in Black-to determine whether the particular hate speech legislation in question
has in fact limited speech more severely than was necessary to
achieve the government's objective.
This case-by-case balancing resembles the proportionality
test devised by the Canadian Supreme Court in Oakes but there is
little indication that the U.S. Court will abandon its categorical
approach in other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence." In
fact, in at least one particular area where proportionality doesn't
lend itself particularly well to resolving the issue, a recent Canadian decision shows that the Canadian Court is inclined to adopt a
categorical approach similar to that of the United States Supreme
Court. But before examining this recent decision and its similarities to U.S. free exercise jurisprudence, it is best to see how the
Oakes proportionality test has been applied to infringements of
the freedom of religion in the past.

III.

THE TRAITIONAL. PROPORTIONALITY APPROACH TO THE
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN CANADA

In 1980, the Province of Ontario enacted the Retail Business
Holiday Act which required mandatory Sunday store closings.
Several retailers-particularly those who, for religious reasons,
82. See Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 1525-1529 (describing how anti-Semitic groups
sometimes attack Zionism, blurring the boundary between political ideology and
simple racism, and how white supremacists sometimes harp on statistics indicating
that blacks commit more crimes than whites, suggesting they are formulating
political opinions based on scientific fact or theory). Id. at 1526.
83. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377-78 (1984); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
84. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
32 (1968).
85. For example, the Court, in Black, reaffirms that fighting words still comprise
an unprotected category of speech. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
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closed their businesses on Saturday-brought a constitutional
challenge, alleging the law infringed their freedom of religion. The
Court agreed that Act constituted an infringement of the freedom
of religion because the Act placed a competitive disadvantage on
Saturday-observing retailers-who were forced to close two days
per week-compared to the favorable effect on Sunday-observing
retailers. Accordingly, the Retail Business Holiday Act had to
survive the then newly-minted Oakes test in order to be saved.
In addressing the pressing and substantial legislative objective inquiry, the Court regarded as "self-evident the desirability of
enabling parents to have regular days off from work in common
with their [children] *"87 Further, the aim of protecting employees
from being overworked and being alienated from their closest
social bonds in light of the growing trend of wide-scale store openings and the erosion of statutory holidays was not one the Court
was willing to deem "unimportant or trivial." 8 The Act was held to
address a pressing and substantial concern.
The Court moved on to the rational connection inquiry where
the Court asked whether it was acceptable for the legislature to
focus exclusively on the retail industry."' The government had provided extensive evidence that the retail labor force was especially
vulnerable to pressure from employers due to its "low level of
unionization, its high proportion of women, and its generally heterogeneous composition."" Accordingly, the legislature had
targeted a sector of business where there existed particularly
urgent concerns seeking to aid constituencies that seemed especially needy. The Court found the Act to be rationally connected to
its objective.
Whether the Act minimally impaired the religious rights of
Saturday observers was the more difficult question. The Court
emphasized that it was "incumbent on a legislature which enacts
Sunday closing laws to attempt very seriously to alleviate the
effects of those laws on Saturday observers." 91 Fortunately in this
regard, the Act contained numerous exemptions. Generally
exempted business included pharmacies, gas stations, flower
stores, laundromats, boat and vehicle rental stores, and educa86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

R. v. Videoficks, Ltd., [19861 2 S.C.R. 713, 765-66 (Can.).
Id. at 770.
Id.
Id. at 770-71.
Id. at 771.
R. v. Videoficks, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 782 (Can.).
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tional, recreational or amusement services . 92 Of greater importance was an explicit exemption for businesses of less than 5,000
square feet that had closed on Saturday, so long as on Sunday
they employed fewer than seven workers who serve the public.9 "
The Court decided that these exemptions were proof of the legislature's "serious effort ... to accommodate the freedom of religion of
Saturday observers, insofar as that is possible without undue
damage to the scope and quality of the pause day objective."" It
was the existence of these exemptions that saved the statute during the minimal impairment analysis. Focusing primarily on the
efforts of the legislature to accommodate, the Court found that the
effects of the Act were not disproportionate to the legislative objective (the third prong of the proportionality inquiry under Oakes),
and the Act was held to be justified under Section 1 of the Charter.
Under the Oakes test-as it has been applied to Canada's
generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion-the
legislature must make serious attempts to accommodate the religious rights of those who are negatively affected by its laws. This is
deeply contrasted by the United States Supreme Court's categorical model, which affords great leeway to the legislature. As will be
described below, under the United States Supreme Court's current free exercise jurisprudence, so long as the government has
not purposefully enacted legislation aimed at suppressing religious practice, a generally applicable law that incidentally affects
religion will nearly always be upheld.
IV.

CATEGORIZATION IN UNITED STATES
FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE

Long ago, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that when it came
to legislation that negatively affects the ability to freely exercise
one's religion, lilt is basic that no showing merely of rational relationship to some colorable state interest [will] suffice."',' Thus, the
Court held that strict scrutiny would apply "in this highly sensitive constitutional area."" But, in what Professor Chemerinsky
calls a "radical change" 97 in free exercise jurisprudence, the Court
expressly changed course in Employment Div., Dep't of Human
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 727.
Id.
Id. at 783.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
Id.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at §12.3.2.3.
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Res. of Oregon v. Smith."8
Smith involved an Oregon law that prohibited the use of
peyote, a potent hallucinogen. Respondents were Native Americans who had been fired from a private drug rehabilitation center
due to their religiously inspired, sacramental use of the drug.
Because they were technically discharged for work-related misconduct, they were subsequently denied unemployment benefits.
Relying on Sherbert, the Respondents invited the Court to apply
strict scrutiny and overturn the denial of their unemployment
benefits based on Oregon's ban on peyote because this result
unmistakably conflicted with the Native Americans' religious
practice. The Court did not accept the invitation.
The Smith Court began its analysis by quoting the First
Amendment, which prohibits Congress from making laws
"9respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . "9 As with the freedom of speech cases, the
Court has rejected a literal reading of this text, which suggests an
absolute bar against laws that somehow restrict the free exercise
of religion."' 0 In Smith, the Court expanded on its rejection of this
absolutist view, stating that the United States is "a cosmopolitan
nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious
preference." 01 Accordingly, to permit religious exemptions from
neutral laws of general applicability would "make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect . . . permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." 02
Instead of allowing for this chaotic result, the Smith Court took a
highly deferential approach-applying only rational basis scrutiny-and held that the First Amendment is not violated when an
otherwise valid law of general applicability incidentally affects the
free exercise of religion.'
Congress was unimpressed with the Smith decision and, in an
attempt to restore strict scrutiny as the applicable standard to all
free exercise claims, passed The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA"). RFRA decreed that the government may only sub98. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
99. U.S. CONST.

amend. 1.

100. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (differentiating
between the freedom to believe, which cannot be regulated, and the freedom to act,
which can be regulated out of a concern for the protection of society).
101. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
102. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67
(1878) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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stantially burden a person's exercise of religion "in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest" where the means chosen are
"the least restrictive" possible."~ This statutory language evokes
elements of an Oakes-style proportionality test-namely, "pressing and substantial concern" and "minimal impairment.""' 5 But
soon after its passing, the Supreme Court found RFRA itself to be
unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments." The
High Court has not yet definitively ruled on the issue but several
circuits hold that the Act remains in force as applied to the federal
government. 107
The Supreme Court applied Smith in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah' to invalidate a city ordinance that
prohibited the ritual sacrifice of animals. Although at first glance
it would seem that such a law was neutral and of general applicability, the Court found otherwise. By examining the record, which
included the minutes of the city council meetings, and observing
that the law permitted other religious killings-like kosher
slaughtering-and exempted every form of secular animal slaughter, the Court determined that this particular law had as its sole
aim the suppression of the Santeria religion. 0 ' In fact, the Court
explained that the ordinance was "gerrymandered" with care to
proscribe only religious conduct." 0 It was therefore neither neutral nor generally applicable, as would be required in order to fit
into the category of laws described in Smith and could not be
upheld under the relaxed, rational basis threshold.
Thus, the current state of U.S. law is that when state and
local governments pass a neutral, generally applicable law that
incidentally burdens religious practice, the law falls into a category where it need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest to pass constitutional muster. On July 24, 2009,
the Canadian Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta"1 ' indicating that the
current state of Canadian law in this area may now be the same.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
105. See R. v. Oakes. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 139.
106. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress had
exceeded its powers under §5 of the 14th Amendment in enacting the statute.)
107. See, e.g., Kikumura v. Gallegos, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001); In re Bruce
Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
108. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
109. Id. at 542.
110. Id.
111. [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.).
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V. THE CAAIAN SUPREME COURT'S USE OF
CATEGORIZATION REGARDING INFRINGEMENTS OF
THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION
The Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony ("Hutterites")
believe that the Second Commandment prohibits them from having their photographs taken."' 2 Until 2003, the Province of Alberta
had issued photoless driver's licenses to those who objected to having their picture taken on religious grounds.' However, in an
effort to minimize identity theft, Alberta decided to do away with
the photoless licenses and required all license holders to be photographed so that their pictures could be placed in a digital facial
recognition data bank."' In an attempt to accommodate the Hutterites' sincerely held religious beliefs, the Province offered to
issue sealed licenses to the Hutterites so that they would never
have to see the photo, or alternatively, to offer them photoless
licenses so long as they had their pictures taken for placement in
the digital photo bank. Because it is the act of having their photo
taken that is repugnant to their religious beliefs, the only compromise the Hutterites were willing to accept was that they not have
their photo taken and be issued photoless licenses marked "Not to
be used for identification purposes."115 Due to this impasse, the
Hutterites brought a constitutional challenge against Alberta's
new photo requirement, alleging it infringed their freedom of
religion, guaranteed under the Charter."1 '
The Province of Alberta conceded that the photo requirement
infringed upon the Hutterites' Charter right and so the Court was
only asked to determine whether this infringement could be
upheld under Section 1 as a reasonable limit, demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society."17 Before delving into step
7. The
112. Hutterian Brethren, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, 2009 SCC 37 (Can.) at
Second Commandment states: "You shall not make for yourself an idol, or any
likeness of what is in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the water under
earth." Exodus 20:4. The Colony members believe that a photograph is a "likeness"
within the meaning of this text.
113. Hutterian Brethren, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.) at T 5.
114. Id. at 10. The digital photo bank was connected to facial recognition software
that analyzed the photographs of those who applied for licenses. The system allowed
the government to ensure that the person trying to renew or replace a license was the
same person represented by the existing photo in the data bank. Id.
115. Id. at T 13.
116. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
ch. 11 (U.K.) (Charter) § 2(a) ("Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms ...
(a) freedom of conscience and religion.").
117. Hutterian Brethren, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567at T 34.
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one of the Oakes test, however, the Court stated that "[w~here a
complex regulatory response to a social problem is challenged,
courts will generally take a more deferential posture throughout
the [Section] 1 analysis."118 With this deferential standard in
mind, the Court applied the Oakes test. The Court had no difficulty in determining that maintaining the integrity of the driver's
license system to minimize identity theft was a pressing and substantial goal. But asking whether the universal photo requirement was rationally connected to that goal, was where Court's
deferential posture led it to stray from the expected Oakes proportionality requirements.
The lower court, citing both Oakes and Videoficks,"' stated
that the rational connection inquiry requires "an assessment of
whether the impugned law has been carefully designed to achieve
the indentified objective." 2 0 "If the law is not appropriately tailored to suit its purpose, it will fail this inquiry. .. .""I'Noting that
there are over 700,000 Albertans who do not hold driver's licenses
and whose photos are therefore not in the digital bank, the lower
court held that the mandatory photo requirement did "not seem to
be well-tailored to address the problem of seeking licenses in the

name of another.'1 2 2 Interestingly however, the Supreme Court
held that the government must only show "that it is reasonable to
suppose that the limit may further the goal, not that it will do
S. 1123 Under this relaxed standard, the Court was able to find a
rational connection based on the government's somewhat tautological argument that "a universal system of photo identification
for drivers will be more effective in preventing identity theft than

a system that grants exemptions

.

... 12

Of perhaps greater concern in the rational connection analysis was the lack of evidence suggesting that the photo exemptions
were in any way problematic. As mentioned above in the discussion of Video ficks, the Ontario government had completed considerable research regarding exploitation of retail workers. 2
118. Id. at 37.
119. R v. Oakes, [19861 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.); R. v. Videoflicks, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R.
713 (Can.).
120. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta, [20071 77 Alta. L.R. (4th) 281,
297 (finding the photo requirement to be disproportionate under Oakes and striking it
down).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 298.
123. Hutterian Brethren, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567at 45.
124. Id. at 49.
125. R. v. Videoflicks, Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 123 (Can.)
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Although the Hutterian Brethren Court relied heavily on Videoflicks, it was not troubled by the fact that there was "no evidence
from the government to suggest that [photolessi licenses...
caused any harm at all to the integrity of the licensing system. 2
Despite this evidentiary deficiency, the Court still concluded that
Alberta had established that the photo requirement was rationally connected to its stated goal, and therefore, moved on to the
minimal impairment analysis.
Before embarking on this section of the Oakes test, the Court
stated-without citing precedent-that in making the minimal
impairment assessment, "the courts accord the legislature a measure of deference, particularly on complex social issues .. 12As
in Videoflicks, the Hutterian Brethren Court focused on potentially less-restrictive alternatives and the legislative exemptions
offered as a compromise. In Videoflicks, Ontario had offered general exemptions to the mandatory Sunday closings to many business sectors, and specifically, exempted certain Saturdayobserving retailers. The Video/licks Court found that by offering
these exemptions, the legislature had struck a fair balance
between freedom of religion and the Province' s goal of making
sure that retail employees were not over-worked. In contrast,
Alberta offered to issue the Hutterites sealed photo licenses or
photoless licenses so long as a photo was taken to be stored in the
digital database. Both of these options involve "the very act that
offends the religious beliefs of the Wilson Colony members, 2 and
were thus no compromise at all.
Rather than focusing on the minimal impairment of the Hutterites' religious rights, the Court dwelled on the minimal impairment of the government's objective. Although the Court conceded
that "it is difficult to quantify in exact terms how much risk of
fraud would result from permitted exemptions," 2 9 it somehow
agreed with the Province that allowing photoless licenses would
significantly compromise the objective and greatly increase the
risk of identity theft. 13 0 This conclusion is problematic in light of
the absence of any evidence that the photo exemptions had any
negative effect on the integrity of the driver's license system.
Before moving on to the final stage of the Oakes test, the
126. Hutterian Brethren, [20091 2 S.C.R. 567at %156 (Abella, J., dissenting)
(emphasis supplied).
127. Id. at 53.
128. Id. at 148 (Abella, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 81.
130. Id. at 60.
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Court reiterated that "laws of general application are not tailored
to the unique needs of individual claimants"'and that the legislature "cannot be expected to tailor a law to every possible future

contingency, or every sincerely held religious belief"131 2 This language is highly reminiscent of that used by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Smith."'3
As is noticeable in the Canadian cases analyzed above, the
"teffects" section of the proportionality test has been somewhat of a
throwaway. As Professor Peter Hogg points out, there is no case
where this section has been decisive to the outcome."' 4 If a law has
a pressing and substantial objective, is rationally connected to
that objective, and minimally impairs the Charter right, Hogg
asks how it is possible that the law's effects will somehow be disproportionate to its objective."' 5 Cognizant of this criticism, the
HutterianBrethren Court devoted a substantial amount of time to
weighing the salutary effects of the universal photo requirement
against the deleterious effects on the Hutterites. Here, the Court
decided that the Hutterites were not left with the choice of disobeying the Second Commandment or giving up their self-sufficient, rural way of life. "The law does not compel the taking of a
photo. It merely provides that a person who wishes to obtain a
driver's license must permit a photo to be taken for the photo iden-

tification bank.113 ' According to the Court, the Hutterites could
simply hire people with licenses to accomplish the tasks that
require driving.' The dissent pointed out that this suggestion
"fails to appreciate the significance of [the Hutterites'] self-suffi36
ciency to the autonomous integrity of their religious community"
and invoked the Videoflicks pronouncement that "indirect but
non-trivial burdens on religious practice are prohibited by the
[Charter] .""9 But the majority, while recognizing the significant
financial costs to the Colony, and the interference with the Hutterian tradition of being self-sufficient, still concluded that the
131. Hutterian Brethren, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, 2009 SCC 37 (Can.) at 69.
132. Id.
133. "Any society adopting [a system that tailors laws to accommodate religious
beliefs] would be courting anarchy, [a] danger [that] increases in direct proportion to
the society's diversity of religious beliefs ...... Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res.
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
134. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF CANADA § 38.12 (5th ed. Supp. 2007).
135. Id.
136. Hutterian Brethren, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567at %98.
137. Id. at 97.
138. Id. at 167 (Abella, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 168 (Abella, J., dissenting).
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deleterious effects imposed upon the Hutterites' freedom of relig4
ion did not outweigh the salutary effects of the law. 1
It thus appears that the Canadian Supreme Court has forgotten (or chosen to part with) its roots in both Videoflicks and Oakes
and is instead deferring to the legislature when it comes to laws of
general applicability that incidentally affect the freedom of religion. Although the Court went through the motions of the Oakes
test, the end result appears to be that generally applicable lawsmeaning those not drafted for the sole purpose of hindering religious practice-fall into a category of legislation that is virtually
immune from constitutional challenge.
The Hutterian Brethren Court-although it nowhere explicitly states that it is applying a categorical analysis-sheds light
on why proportionality may not be the best tool for addressing
generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion.
Because the Oakes test requires the Court to weigh the salutary
effects of a measure against the deleterious effects upon the claimant's religious beliefs, the test implicitly asks the Court to determine how important the particular religious tenet being interfered
with is to that claimant. The Hutterian Brethren Court acknowledges the difficulty of this task when it states that "[there is no
magic barometer to measure the seriousness of a particular limit
on a religious practice."' The Court explains that "Nsome aspects
of a religion, like prayers and the basic sacraments, may be so
sacred that any significant limit verges on forced apostasy. Other
practices may be optional or a matter of personal choice." 4 More
problematic in performing a balancing test is that "[bietween
these two extremes lies a vast array of beliefs and practices, more
important to some adherents than to others. 4
Rather than attempt to determine just how important the
Second Commandment is to the Hutterites, or how important the
ingestion of peyote is to the members of a Native American faith,
the High Courts seem to have recognized that the safest alternative is to essentially exempt generally applicable laws from constiA categorical
tutional challenge on religious grounds. 4
140. Id. at 103.
141. Hutterian Brethren, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, 2009 SCC 37 (Can.) at $ 89.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. As exemplified in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court is willing to find that some laws that seem
neutral and generally applicable are, in fact, not. The Canadian Court also alludes in
Hutterian Brethren, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, to the fact that a generally applicable law
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approach-where so long as the particular law is neutral and of
general applicability, it will be immune from a constitutional challenge-allows the Courts to avoid making the controversial and
perhaps impossible determinations required under a proportionality analysis. Categorical immunization also assures that generally
applicable laws are not consistently under constitutional attack by
the diverse array of religious adherents who inhabit the United
States and Canada.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the categorical approach may have been a suitable compromise when dealing with a constitution that seems to call for an
absolute ban against laws that infringe the freedom of speech, categorization does not lend itself well to recent advent of hate
speech regulation. This is because it is difficult to precisely classify hate speech, which is often politically charged and therefore
highly deserving of First Amendment protection. As a result, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in R.A.V and Black applied a more Canadian-style balancing test, whereby it weighed the value of the
speech being regulated against the government's legitimate goal
in regulating it, and asking whether the legislature had gone too
far in attaining that goal.
Conversely, the Oakes test is an efficient tool with respect to
the language of Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, which appears
to instruct the Canadian courts to weigh the affected right against
a demonstrably justifiable government interest. But when it
comes to neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally
burden religious practice, a proportionality test unacceptably
forces the Court to determine just how important a certain religious practice is to the particular claimants before it. Proportionality also opens the flood gates to endless litigation due to the
diversity in religious preference in both the United States and
Canada. To avoid this, the Hutterian Brethren Court departed
from the typically high standards of the Oakes test, and instead
insulated neutral, generally applicable laws from constitutional
challenge.
But these decisions do not indicate that the High Courts are
wholly choosing to part with their normal mode of operation. On
the contrary, these two areas have simply created constitutional
that limited prayer or some other fundamental sacrament may undoubtedly fail a
Section 1 analysis, regardless of how much deference is afforded to the legislature.
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anomalies where the preferred or expected method of analysis is
unsuitable. R.AYV, Black, and Hutterian Brethren can be best
described as necessary constitutional eruptions on an otherwise
unsullied analytical landscape.

